Week 2
Philosophical Investigations - Wittengenstein P. 1-48
Augustine’s Description of Language Learning (§1)
- Augustine, in Confessions I/8, describes learning language as a child by observing adults naming objects and moving toward them, suggesting words are labels for objects.
- This implies that language consists of words naming objects, and sentences combine these names.
- The text interprets this as rooting the idea that every word has a meaning tied to an object it represents.
- Augustine focuses primarily on nouns (e.g., “table,” “chair”), with actions, properties, and other word types as secondary.
Example of Language Use: Shopkeeper (§1)
- A person gives a shopkeeper a slip marked “five red apples”; the shopkeeper retrieves apples by matching “red” to a color sample and counting to “five.”
- This illustrates words operating in practical use, not requiring an abstract meaning beyond their application.
- Questions like “How does he know what ‘five’ means?” are answered by his actions, showing meaning is tied to use, not inherent essence.
Primitive Language Critique (§2)
- Augustine’s view reflects a primitive notion of language where words simply name objects.
- A counterexample is a language for a builder (A) and assistant (B), using words like “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” “beam”; A calls them out, and B brings the stones.
- This is presented as a complete, primitive language focused on use, not naming alone.
Limits of Augustine’s System (§3)
- Augustine describes a communication system, but it doesn’t cover all language uses.
- It’s valid for a narrow domain, not the entirety of language, akin to saying games are only about moving pieces on a board—true for board games, but not all games.
Misinterpreting Language Like a Script (§4)
- Imagine a script where letters denote sounds, emphasis, and punctuation; interpreting it as only sound-to-letter correspondence oversimplifies it.
- Augustine’s view similarly oversimplifies language by reducing it to naming.
Clarity Through Primitive Uses (§5)
- The general concept of meaning as object-correspondence creates a haze; studying primitive language uses (like the builder’s) clarifies purpose and function.
- Children learn language through such primitive forms via training, not explanation.
Language as a Complete System (§6)
- Imagine the builder’s language (§2) as the entire language of a tribe; children are trained to use words in activities.
- Teaching involves pointing to objects and saying words (e.g., “slab”), establishing associations, not necessarily evoking mental images as the purpose.
Learning Through Use (§7)
- In practice, one calls words, and another acts; in learning, the pupil names objects or repeats words after the teacher—both are speech-like processes.
- These are “language-games,” akin to how children learn native languages, encompassing language and woven activities.
Expanded Language Game (§8)
- The builder’s language expands with “number-words” (e.g., alphabet letters), “there,” “this,” and color samples; e.g., “d-slab-there” with pointing and a sample.
- This shows varied word functions beyond naming, tied to specific uses.
Learning the Expanded Language (§9)
- Children learn number-words by rote and use; ostensive teaching (e.g., pointing and counting “a, b, c slabs”) occurs, though “there” and “this” are taught via use and pointing.
What Words Signify (§10)
- Words signify through their use, not abstract reference; saying “slab” signifies a slab removes misunderstandings only if use is known.
- Assimilating descriptions doesn’t make uses similar—they remain distinct.
Words as Tools (§11)
- Words have diverse functions, like tools in a toolbox (hammer, pliers, etc.), despite uniform appearance in speech or writing, confusing philosophers.
Locomotive Analogy (§12)
- Handles in a locomotive cabin look similar but serve different roles (crank, switch, brake); words likewise have varied functions despite appearances.
Signifying Something (§13)
- Saying “every word signifies something” is empty without specifying what distinction is meant (e.g., from nonsense like “juwiwallera”).
Tools Modifying (§14)
- Claiming all tools modify (e.g., hammer modifies nail position) falters with rulers or glue—assimilating uses gains nothing.
Names on Tools (§15)
- Tools bear marks (names); showing a mark prompts B to bring the tool, likened to naming as attaching a label.
Color Samples in Language (§16)
- Color samples in (§8) are tools of language, not spoken words, akin to quotation marks in “say ‘the’.”
Word Types (§17)
- Language (§8) has word types (e.g., “slab” vs. “d”); classification depends on purpose and inclination, like grouping tools or chess pieces.
Completeness of Language (§18)
- Languages (§2, §8) being command-only doesn’t make them incomplete; our language evolved with additions (e.g., chemical symbols), like a city with old and new parts.
Varied Language Forms (§19)
- Languages can consist of orders, questions, etc.; “Slab!” in (§2) can be a word or degenerate sentence, its meaning tied to use, not mental translation.
Meaning Sentences (§20)
- “Bring me a slab” can be one word or four, depending on contrast with other sentences; meaning isn’t a mental act but use in context.
Assertion vs. Command (§21)
- “Five slabs” as report or command differs by role, tone, or use; form (e.g., question-like commands) doesn’t fix function.
Frege’s Assertion (§22)
- Frege’s idea that assertions contain assumptions rests on rewriting sentences (“It’s asserted that…”), but this adds nothing; use, not form, matters.
Sentence Types (§23)
- Countless sentence types exist (e.g., ordering, describing, joking); language-games evolve, reflecting diverse activities.
Misunderstanding Questions (§24)
- Ignoring language-game variety prompts questions like “What is a question?”; descriptions vary widely (e.g., coordinates, moods).
Animals and Language (§25)
- Animals don’t use language (beyond primitive forms) not due to mental lack, but because it’s part of human activities like ordering or chatting.
Naming Misconception (§26)
- Learning language isn’t just naming objects (e.g., “Water!” “Help!”); naming prepares for use, not the use itself.
Naming in Context (§27)
- Asking names or inventing them (e.g., for dolls) is a language-game; names function within games, not absolutely.
Ostensive Definition Ambiguity (§28)
- Pointing to define “two” or “red” can be misinterpreted (e.g., as a group or color); any explanation can be misunderstood.
Context in Definition (§29)
- “This number is ‘two’” needs “number” explained; understanding depends on context and prior knowledge.
Role Clarity (§30)
- Ostensive definitions work if the word’s role is clear (e.g., knowing it’s a color word); some knowledge is prerequisite.
Chess Example (§31)
- “This is the king” explains use only if chess rules are known; prior game mastery shapes understanding.
Learning as a Foreigner (§32)
- Augustine’s view likens a child to a foreigner guessing meanings; it assumes prior thinking, not raw learning.
Pointing Specificity (§33-35)
- Pointing to shape vs. color isn’t just mental focus; it’s contextual, with characteristic acts (e.g., tracing), but use defines meaning, not accompanying experiences.
Mental Acts (§36)
- Lacking a physical act for “pointing at shape,” we posit a mental one, imagining a spirit where no body exists.
Name-Object Relation (§37)
- The relation varies (e.g., mental images, written marks); it’s seen in language-games, not abstractly.
“This” as Name (§38)
- “This” isn’t a name like “slab,” despite philosophical tendencies to treat it as such; names are explained by pointing, not used with it.
Names and Simples (§39)
- Names should signify simples (e.g., “Nothung” loses meaning if broken), but sentences retain sense, challenging this view.
Meaning vs. Bearer (§40)
- Meaning isn’t the object (bearer); “Mr. N.N. dies” refers to the bearer, not meaning dying.
Broken Tools (§41)
- If “N”’s tool breaks, its sign may lose use unless a new convention (e.g., head-shaking) preserves it.
Unused Names (§42)
- Signs like “X” (never used) can still fit the game with agreed responses, showing meaning via use.
Meaning as Use (§43)
- For many cases, a word’s meaning is its use in language, sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.
Names Without Bearers (§44)
- “Nothung has a sharp blade” works absent its bearer; other games might require presence, using demonstratives.
“This” and Presence (§45)
- “This” always has a bearer, but isn’t a name—it’s a tool, not defined by pointing.
Simples in Philosophy (§46)
- Socrates (Theaetetus) and others argue names denote unexplained simples; composites weave names into explanations.
What is Simple? (§47)
- Simplicity depends on context (e.g., chair parts, chessboard squares); “composite” varies by use, not absolute.
Language-Game of Simples (§48)
- A game with colored squares (e.g., “RRBGGGRWW”) treats squares as simples; simplicity shifts with perspective (e.g., color + shape).
Naming vs. Describing (§49)
- Naming elements (e.g., “R”) isn’t describing unless in use; it’s a preparatory act, not a game move.
Being and Elements (§50)
- Elements (e.g., color samples) are tools, not objects with being/non-being; their role is paradigmatic, not existential.
Brief Summary of Sections 1–50
In the opening sections of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein critiques Augustine’s view of language, which portrays language learning as simply naming objects and words as labels for things. He argues this perspective is overly simplistic, using the example of a builder’s primitive language (e.g., shouting “slab!” to mean “bring me a slab”) to demonstrate that meaning depends on use and context, not just reference to objects. Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-games, showing that words gain meaning through the roles they play in specific activities, much like tools in a toolbox vary in function. He highlights how misunderstanding arises when we fixate on a word’s form rather than its practical application.
He further examines ostensive definitions—pointing at something while naming it—and notes their ambiguity: without understanding the word’s role, such definitions can be misinterpreted. Wittgenstein stresses that grasping language involves knowing how words are used, not merely associating them with objects or mental images. He also challenges the philosophical quest for simple, indestructible elements that names supposedly denote, arguing that simplicity is relative to context, not absolute. By the end of section 50, he rejects the notion that elements (e.g., color samples) possess an inherent “being,” framing them instead as instruments within language-games.
Broader Implications of Philosophical Investigations
Philosophical Investigations fundamentally reshapes philosophical thought by rejecting the idea of a universal, fixed structure for language and emphasizing its diverse, practical nature. Wittgenstein proposes that language consists of myriad language-games, each tied to specific human activities or “forms of life,” rather than a single essence. This shift from abstract theorizing to a focus on use carries significant implications:
Meaning as Use: Wittgenstein’s core insight—“the meaning of a word is its use in the language”—redefines meaning as something dynamic and context-dependent. This undermines traditional views that link meaning to fixed referents, mental images, or abstract entities, emphasizing instead how words function in everyday practices.
Language and Reality: The book challenges the correspondence theory of truth, which holds that language mirrors an external reality. Wittgenstein suggests that language is intertwined with our forms of life, shaping how we engage with the world rather than passively reflecting it. This redirects philosophical attention from metaphysics to lived experience.
Philosophical Method: Wittgenstein advocates a new approach to philosophy: rather than seeking metaphysical answers, he aims to dissolve philosophical problems by clarifying language use. This “ordinary language philosophy” influenced thinkers like Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin, who similarly used linguistic analysis to untangle conceptual confusions.
Critique of Essentialism: By arguing that concepts like “game” or “language” lack a single defining trait—united instead by family resemblances (overlapping similarities)—Wittgenstein critiques essentialist philosophies that seek universal definitions. This promotes a more flexible, context-sensitive understanding of meaning.
Mind and Language: The book hints at a rejection of Cartesian dualism, where mental states (e.g., pain or intention) are not private inner phenomena but are expressed and understood through language and behavior. This challenges introspective approaches to the mind, aligning mental life with public, linguistic practices.